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Abstract 
Identifying the sources of memories (e.g., who carried out an action, whether an event happened 
or was suggested, when an instance of a repeated event occurred) is an important skill in 
providing accurate accounts of events in forensic investigations. Sensitivity to the nature and 
development of children’s source-monitoring skills can inform interviewing practices. Five 
perspectives addressing alternate aspects of the development of children’s source monitoring are 
outlined (source-monitoring theory, fuzzy-trace theory, schema theory, the person-based 
perspective, and the mental-state reasoning model). Six main areas of empirical research 
stemming from these theories are then discussed with emphasis on how the findings relate to the 
forensic arena: The similarity of sources, the identity of the agent, prospective processing, the 
relation of source monitoring to other cognitive skills, metacognitive understanding, and the 
stringency of source-monitoring decisions. The research reviewed is used to address two main 
applications to forensic investigations: (a) expectations of child witnesses, and (b) interviewing 
protocols. 
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Children's Ability To Distinguish Between Memories From Multiple Sources: 
Implications For The Quality And Accuracy Of Eyewitness Statements 
 One of the most important investigative tools in forensics is the interview. Interviewing 
victims of and witnesses to crimes is especially important in investigations where there is little 
physical evidence and the main evidence therefore comes from eyewitness accounts. Concern 
has been raised  about the reliability of eyewitness testimony, however, because many factors 
can have adverse effects on the length, quality, and accuracy of testimony. In addition to 
providing an accurate account of exactly what transpired during a crime, witnesses must also 
accurately identify the sources or origins of event details. Examples include identifying the 
source of an action (e.g., Who did it, Perpetrator A or Perpetrator B?), the source of a voice (e.g., 
Who said it, me or the perpetrator?), the reality status of a past event (e.g., Did it really happen or 
did I just dream it? Did I really see it happen or did I just hear about it?), and identifying one 
incident from a series of incidents (e.g., Did he touch me the first time he babysat or the last time 
he babysat? Did he touch me in the bedroom or the bathroom?). In all of these examples, child 
victims and witnesses must retrieve their memories and identify the precise source of those 
memories. Research on the development of such “source monitoring” (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & 
Lindsay, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981) can provide us with accurate expectations of child 
witnesses’ capabilities, contribute to the development of appropriate interviewing protocols, and 
shed light on interviewers’ judgments of child witnesses’ credibility. 
 There are numerous source distinctions relevant to the forensic arena (see Table 1 for 
examples). Witnesses need to monitor various sources contained in a target incident (i.e., the 
alleged crime) such as distinguishing witnesses’ actions from those of the perpetrators. 
Witnesses also must distinguish memories of the target incident from memories of other, non-
target events that relate in some way to the target incident (e.g., television programs, hearing 
friends’ similar experiences, informal interviews with parents or teachers, other instances of the 
alleged crime; Roberts & Powell, in press). Related events may take place before the target 
incident (preevent experiences) or after the target incident (postevent experiences) and have 
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positive or negative effects on memories and source monitoring of the target incident. If children 
are exposed to pre- or postevent information that is consistent with the target experience, the 
memory traces of the target incident can be strengthened, making them more resistant to decay 
and suggestive influences (Brainerd, Reyna, Howe, & Kingma, 1990; Pezdek & Roe, 1995; 
Warren & Lane, 1995). The preservation of a detailed memory of an event may help source 
monitoring in two ways: (a) the source can be easily and accurately recalled (e.g., Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1998) and/or (b) well-rehearsed memories of actual events contain perceptual and 
contextual information that is  typical of memories of actually-experienced events, resulting in 
attributions that the events actually occurred (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
There are times, however, when the details in target and non-target events (i.e., pre- or post-event 
experiences) are inconsistent, resulting in confusions between memories of target and non-target 
events (Poole & Lindsay, 2001a; Roberts & Blades, 1999; Thierry, Spence, & Memon, in press).  
 It may be helpful to consider two main factors that can result in source errors. First are 
suggestive interviewing techniques in which alternate representations of reality are presented, 
thereby leading to later confusion between memories of experienced and suggested details. In 
investigations, then, it may be worthwhile to take a history of all informal discussions about the 
alleged incident that took place between the alleged child victim and others. Investigators may 
then be able to assess how suggestive those discussions may have been and thus gain an estimate 
of potential source problems. A second factor that may promote source errors includes aspects 
integral to children’s memories of the events themselves (e.g., similarity of incidents, lengthy 
delays between incident and investigation). Investigations may reveal conditions that do or do 
not promote source errors. I address both suggestive interviewing and event characteristics in this 
review.  
 The review is split into four parts. The development of source-monitoring skills is 
complex and so the first section outlines the main characteristics of the developmental path. In 
the second section I review the main theories that address the development of source monitoring. 
The theories each have a different focus, thus providing contrasting conceptions of what source 
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monitoring entails. Their value lies in the foundation they provide for processing the now large 
amount of empirical research on source-monitoring development, research that is reviewed in the 
third section. Finally, I summarize the relevance of theory and research on children’s source 
monitoring to the forensic arena. 
Characteristics of the Source-Monitoring Developmental Path 
Substantial effort has been made over the last 15-20 years into investigating the 
development of source monitoring, although much of the recent research has focused on tracking 
its development in preschoolers. It is now clear that significant improvements in source 
monitoring take place in the 3- to 8-year age range.  
The development of source monitoring skills is not uniformly linear. Children gain 
competence at some types of source distinctions (e.g., memories of actions performed by the self 
vs. another person) before other types (e.g., memories of performed vs. imagined actions; Foley 
& Johnson, 1985). Although there is some improvement between the ages of 3 and 4 years in the 
latter kind of source monitoring as well as in distinguishing memories of performed and 
pretended actions, there is no concomitant improvement at this age in the ability to distinguish 
between pretended and imagined actions (Welch-Ross, 1995). Pretended and imagined actions 
differ because only the former includes motor behavior. The varied developmental pathways of 
children’s source monitoring provides clues to factors that are important for its development. 
That children could distinguish performed from pretended actions before pretend-imagine 
distinctions, for example, suggests that children’s understanding of fictional mental states is 
associated with the development of these specific kinds of source-monitoring skills (Welch-Ross, 
1995). 
The development of children’s source monitoring is gradual rather than abrupt. Children 
as young as 3 years old appropriately rely on informative sources more than uninformative 
sources (e.g., knowing that someone who has looked at an object is better informed than one who 
has not; Robinson, 2000). Children younger than 5 or 6, however, cannot later explain how they 
know certain information (e.g., what the object was), suggesting that the development of 
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“implicit” source monitoring occurs before explicit awareness of sources or the ability to reflect 
on sources (Robinson, 2000). As with adults’ cognitive skills, children’s source-monitoring 
accuracy is sensitive to the nature of tasks, and so judgments about children’s competence must 
be considered with task factors in mind. For example, 3- to 4-year-olds were able to distinguish 
memories of performed and pretended actions when tested non-verbally but not when tested 
verbally (Roberts & Blades, 1995). Sensitivity to different tasks is relevant to the forensic arena 
because the level of source confusions is dependent on interview technique. As an example, 
children make fewer source errors when they are allowed to freely recall events than when 
interviewers question them specifically about individual details (Roberts & Blades, 1998; 
Roberts & Blades, 1999).  
Before reviewing the empirical literature, I first provide a brief outline of the major 
theories on the development of source monitoring. These theories set the foundation for an 
appraisal of the research that is then reviewed.  
Theories of Source Monitoring Development 
According to source-monitoring theory (Johnson et al., 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981), 
source is attributed through an examination of the characteristics of memories and through 
strategic decision making. According to source-monitoring theory, then, source is inferred at the 
time of recollection rather than encoded at the time of the event.   Memories of events that were 
actually perceived contain more perceptual, contextual, sensory, semantic, and affective 
information than do memories of non-perceived events; memories of non-perceived events lack 
these characteristics but contain more information about the cognitive operations that took place 
at the time of the event (e.g., imagery, generative processes). The qualitative characteristics of 
retrieved information can provide cues to source (e.g., memory of a distinctive body odor may 
cue recognition of the particular person who carried out the action). Source decisions can be 
carried out automatically with little awareness or strategic processes such as using general 
knowledge can be used to infer source (e.g., Person A could not have carried out the action 
because she was on vacation at the time). Strategic processes can be used in parallel or in 
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addition to an examination of memories. Although source-monitoring theory does not contain an 
explicit outline of developmental mechanisms, the quality of recalled memories and the use of 
strategic decision making are central tenets of source-monitoring theory, and so the development 
of memory skills and strategy use necessarily affect source-monitoring development.  
 According to fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Reyna & Brainerd, 1998), the 
focus of children’s source errors lies in the storage and retrieval of the memory trace. Dual 
representations of each detail are stored: A gist representation of what the detail or event was 
about, and a verbatim representation of the exact detail as it was presented. In contrast to source-
monitoring theory, according to fuzzy-trace theory “source” is encoded and represented as 
verbatim details that may or may not be retrieved at the time of test. There are two main ways 
that source errors can thus be made: first, by failing to retrieve the verbatim representation, and 
second, by retrieving verbatim representations of different sources. Developmental 
improvements in memory for source are observed because young children lose verbatim 
information more rapidly than older children and adults, and because children’s verbatim 
representations are more susceptible to interference from gist processing (Ackerman, 1992, 
1994; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). 
 A third account identifies children’s cognitive processing demands as the likely cause of 
source confusions. According to script theories (e.g., Fivush, Kuebli, & Clubb, 1992; Hudson, 
1990; Nelson, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977), children build up a general event representation 
of similar events (e.g., what happens at daycare). This general event representation (or script) 
enables children to recall large amounts of information about events. Each detail that varies from 
event to event is represented in the general event representation by a slot (e.g., color of shirt, day 
of week) and the exact instantiations of the details (e.g., red, blue, green for the shirt example) 
are stored as lists. An instantiation from each list is chosen to fit each slot although the 
mechanisms that drive the choice of instantiations is not well articulated in script theories. 
Source errors, then, can be made because the wrong detail is retrieved (e.g., a detail from a 
different event), as also outlined in fuzzy-trace theory. According to schema confirmation-
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deployment theory (see Farrar & Goodman, 1990), younger children take longer to build up a 
script than older children because of limited cognitive resources. Because all cognitive energy is 
focused on extracting the general, invariant details that will form the script, there are few 
cognitive resources left to note deviations from the script with the result that individual sources 
are “swallowed” into the general event representation.  
 A fourth account of source-monitoring errors, the person-based perspective (Foley & 
Ratner, in press; Ratner & Foley, 1996), focuses mainly on predicting confusions between 
memories of actions. This approach acknowledges the central importance of cognitive operations 
in making source judgments (as outlined in source-monitoring theory, Johnson et al., 1993) but  
attaches special significance to one kind of cognitive operation which can be loosely grouped as 
prospective processes. Prospective processes include anticipating an action sequence, planning 
actions, re-activating memories of previous related actions, and so on. Prospective processing 
(and, hence, source monitoring) can be affected by (a) the perspective (self or other) adopted by 
the individual during the activity, and (b) the goals of an activity and its meaning to the 
individual. Activities that have clear goals associated with them can lead to an increase in 
source-monitoring errors because the goal-directed nature of the task detracts attention away 
from source (e.g., Ratner, Foley, & Gimpert, 2000). For example, in collaborative activities a 
child and another person each perform actions to reach a desired goal. Each partner must 
anticipate and plan the other person’s actions so that they can co-ordinate their own actions. 
Young children are prone to later mistakenly claiming that they carried out their partner’s actions 
(colloquially known as the “I did it” bias; Foley, Ratner, & Passalacqua, 1993a), possibly 
because the children were recoding their partner’s actions as if the children carried out the 
actions themselves. Foley and Ratner have argued that the perspective adopted (e.g., first-person, 
third-person) and the goals of the task affect the prospective processing carried out during the 
task, and that the preservation of source information is not central to the purpose of collaborative 
and goal-directed tasks. While this aids learning (because children can assimilate the partner’s 
actions), it ultimately results in source errors. The person-based perspective, then, is unique 
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among the theories discussed in this review because of its emphasis on the social meaning of an 
event to an individual. 
 Finally, the mental-state reasoning model (Welch-Ross, 2000) was developed to outline 
several potential mechanisms involved in preschoolers’ suggestibility. As an ability to identify 
the source of target and postevent details is related to resistance to suggestibility (e.g., Ackil & 
Zaragoza, 1995; Leichtman, Morse, Dixon, & Spiegel, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001a; Welch-
Ross, Diecidue, & Miller, 1997), source monitoring is a central component in the model and is 
associated with children’s understanding of knowledge states. Such multifaceted understanding 
develops between the ages of 3 and 6 (see Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1986) and includes a 
recognition that the mental state of knowing comes from informative experiences, that specific 
knowledge comes from specific informative experiences (e.g., seeing, hearing), and that a single 
reality can be represented by multiple, sometimes conflicting and counterfactual, representations. 
Understanding of these knowledge states is associated with improved source monitoring (as 
discussed later under Metacognitive Understanding). The mental-state reasoning model, then, 
incorporates key preschool developments into its explanation of source-monitoring skills.  
Empirical Research on the Development of Source Monitoring 
 The theories reviewed above have stimulated empirical research into factors that affect 
children’s source monitoring. In this section, I will identify and review six major factors of 
current research: (a) the similarity of the sources, (b) the identity of the agent (source), (c) 
prospective processing, (d) the relationship of source monitoring to other cognitive skills, (e) 
metacognitive understanding, and (f) the stringency of source decisions. 
The Similarity Issue 
Many child eyewitnesses have been victims of abuse on multiple occasions, as in the case 
of repeated incidents of sexual or physical abuse. Research on children’s reports after multiple 
experiences of a similar event shows that children are often confused between the different 
incidents, for example, reporting a detail from one incident as if it occurred during a different 
one (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999). Research on 
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children’s source monitoring can be useful in understanding what developmental and situational 
factors are associated with confusions between memories of similar events.  
According to the source-monitoring framework, memories of events that are similar are 
more difficult to distinguish than are memories of events that are dissimilar (e.g., Johnson et al., 
1993; Lindsay et al., 1991). Characteristics of target events will inevitably influence the kinds of 
information that are encoded in memories and, given that one method of monitoring source is 
assessing the qualitative characteristics of memories (Johnson et al., 1993), it is not surprising 
that several researchers have found that memories of similar sources are harder to distinguish 
from each other than are memories of dissimilar sources (Day, Howie, & Markham, 1998; Foley, 
Aman, & Gutch, 1987; Foley, Harris, & Hermann, 1994; Lindsay, Johnson, & Kwon, 1991; 
Roberts & Blades, 1999). For example, children had more difficulty distinguishing between 
words spoken by two speakers of the same gender than those spoken by a male and a female 
(Lindsay et al., 1991, Experiment 1). In other studies (e.g., Day et al., 1998; Roberts & Blades, 
1999), children were more confused when asked to make source judgments about similar than 
dissimilar actions. When similar information is encoded from separate sources, there is little 
distinguishing information that can be accessed during retrieval that can help in a source 
judgment. In general, preschoolers appear to be more confused between similar sources than do 
older children and adults (Lindsay et al., 1991). 
Researchers have found that the effects of similarity extend beyond perceptual and 
semantic similarity; functional similarity of sources also affects source monitoring. In a series of 
studies, children between the ages of 3 and 8 years enacted everyday actions (e.g., talking on the 
telephone) using a toy, an object substitute (e.g., a wooden block) or a gestural substitute (e.g., 
using an imaginary telephone; Foley et al., 1994). When they were asked to say how they had 
carried out each action, the children could accurately identify the actions they had performed 
with toys but the younger children were more likely than the older children to inaccurately claim 
that they had used a toy when they had only used a substitute. As the number of source 
misattributions was equal for object and gestural substitutes, Foley et al. concluded that the 3-
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year-olds were confused because of the functional similarity of the actions rather than any 
perceptual similarity between the toys and the substitutes. These results reveal that the basis for 
similarity effects in source misattributions of actions may lie in the activation of motoric 
representations that actions elicit rather than the actual properties of the items (Day et al., 1998).  
When the characteristics of to-be-distinguished sources are similar, successful source 
monitoring can be achieved by directing attention at retrieval to those memory characteristics 
that provide distinguishing information between the sources. In one study, 7- to 10-year-olds 
traced some objects using two different instruments that varied by condition: Some children 
traced objects with a pencil and other objects with a finger, others traced with a stylus (pencil 
with no lead) and a finger, and the remainder traced with a pencil and a stylus. The children were 
later shown the objects and asked to say how they had traced them. Discrimination by the 
children who had used a pencil and a finger was better than discrimination by the children who 
used a finger and a stylus and those who used a pencil and a stylus (Foley et al., 1987). Given 
that tracing actions are highly similar regardless of whether a pencil, a finger, or a stylus is used, 
successful source monitoring by the children in Foley et al.’s study could be achieved if they 
intensively inspected their memories for the presence of information that was different for each 
kind of action. In the present case, memories of both kinesthetic information (what it felt like) 
and visual consequences differed in the pencil-finger condition, whereas the visual consequences 
were similar in the finger-stylus condition (both actions had no visual consequences) and the 
kinesthetic information was similar in the pencil-stylus condition (felt the same to hold a pencil 
and a stylus). Hence, discrimination was easier for children in the pencil-finger condition when 
kinesthetic and visual information were useful cues to source than in the other conditions when 
only one cue to source was available. It may be possible that children have greater difficulty than 
adults in selecting the most useful source cues for particular source judgments. 
A further possibility for Foley et al.’s (1987) findings is that children are deficient in the 
kind of cognitive flexibility that is needed to use multiple source cues. Interacting in events (as 
opposed to simply observing) often results in stronger and more detailed memories of those 
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events (e.g., Tobey & Goodman, 1992). But when 4-, 6-, and 9-year-olds participated in a live, 
staged event and then carried out similar actions when viewing a perceptually-similar interactive 
video, they were later more confused between the events than were same-age children who 
interacted in the live event but merely watched the video (Roberts & Blades, 1998). Roberts and 
Blades argued that, although there was little distinguishing perceptual information between the 
live and video events, the difference in the cognitive operations and kinesthetic feedback 
involved in interacting in the live event versus watching the video provided a basis for 
discrimination. These data highlight the flexibility that is needed in source judgments in the use 
of different cues. Only cognitive and kinesthetic cues would have been useful discriminators in 
Roberts’ and Blades’ study because perceptual and sensory characteristics were similar for both 
the live event and the video. Young children do not always show such cognitive flexibility, and 
so this may underlie some of their failures in source identification (Foley, Wilder, McCall, & 
Van Vorst, 1993b). 
To summarize thus far, similar sources are (in general) more difficult to later discriminate 
than those that differ. Similarity can have at least two effects at encoding. First, similar 
properties of the events may be laid down in memory representations, providing fewer cues at 
retrieval that can be used to distinguish between items. Second, the events may elicit similar 
motoric representations, cognitive operations, or affective reactions which are also represented in 
memory and, again, the amount of discriminating cues available at retrieval is therefore reduced. 
The effects of similarity, then, are seen not just in event similarity (e.g., similar actions) but also 
in the activation of similar operations at the time of the event.  
Another kind of discrimination that is relevant to the forensic arena is distinguishing 
between memories of actions carried out by the same person. For example, children may need to 
distinguish between actions carried out on multiple occasions by the same perpetrator. Also, 
false accusations may occur because children imagine suggested but fictitious actions by a 
person and later mistakenly believe that those actions were actually carried out by that person 
(e.g., Ceci, Loftus, Leichtman, & Bruck, 1994). The similarity effect can be useful when 
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predicting whether source confusions are likely to occur. For example, Lindsay et al. (1991, 
Experiment 3) compared  7- to 10-year-olds’  abilities to distinguish memories of performed and 
imagined actions involving the same or different actors. Children either performed and imagined 
themselves performing actions or watched a confederate perform actions and imagined the 
confederate performing actions (the same-actor conditions). Other children performed actions 
and imagined the confederate performing actions or watched the confederate perform actions and 
imagined themselves performing the actions (labeled the different-actor conditions because the 
actor of the performed and imagined actions were different). Lindsay et al. found that the 
children were more confused between performed and imagined actions in the same-actor than 
different-actor conditions.  Similar findings were also reported by Markham (1991). Lindsay et 
al.’s and Markham’s results suggest that children’s source confusions between performed and 
imagined actions were the result of the similarity effect, that is, that similar sources are more 
confusable than are less similar sources.  
Accumulating evidence, however, shows that difficulty discriminating between similar 
sources is not the sole reason for developmental differences in source monitoring. Foley and 
Ratner (1998, Experiment 1) carried out an experiment replicating the same- and different-actor 
conditions of Lindsay et al.’s (1991) experiment described in the above paragraph. Foley and 
Ratner also added the similarity of actions (similar vs. dissimilar) as a between-subjects factor in 
their design and carried out the experiment with adults and 6-year-olds. Based on the similarity 
effect, one would predict that most source confusions by the children would be observed for 
discriminations between the most similar sources (i.e., when participants in the same-actor 
conditions were asked to discriminate highly similar actions). This prediction was not, however, 
supported. Foley and Ratner found that the 6-year-olds confused the similar actions more than 
the dissimilar actions only when they imagined the confederate carrying out actions. 
Interestingly, this effect was observed regardless of whether the memories of the imagined 
actions were compared with memories of performed actions carried out by the children 
themselves or the confederate (i.e., regardless of whether the actor of the performed and the 
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imagined actions was the same or different). Foley’s and Ratner’s findings imply that the 
similarity effect was insufficient in explaining their pattern of results and that the identity of the 
agent of the imagined actions affected the level of children’s confusions. An important difference 
between Lindsay et al.’s (1991, Experiment 3) study and Foley’s and Ratner’s (1998) study is the 
age of the participants. In Lindsay et al.’s study, the mean age of the children was almost nine 
years and in Foley’s and Ratner’s study, the children were just 6 years old. Hence, identity of the 
agent may affect the source-monitoring performance of younger children only. The effects of the 
identity of the agent in source-monitoring decisions is discussed more fully in the following 
section.1  
Agent Identity 
As described above, some researchers have claimed that the level of source confusions 
varies depending on the identity of the agent of the to-be-discriminated actions (e.g., self, friend, 
unfamiliar person; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983; Foley & Ratner, 
1998b). Many researchers have demonstrated superior source identification for decisions 
regarding the self in comparison to source identification regarding other people (Anderson, 1984; 
Baker-Ward, Hess, & Flannagan, 1990; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983; 
Roberts & Blades, 1998). Six- and 9-year-olds, for example, were more accurate at identifying 
the source of words they had spoken themselves than words that they had heard spoken by a 
confederate (Foley et al., 1983) and this finding was replicated using performed actions as 
stimuli (Foley & Johnson, 1985). Foley and colleagues argued that the advantage in source 
discrimination for self-generated items was because the self-other distinction is well developed 
in school-age children, and they provided evidence to show that the children in one experiment 
used this conceptualization to cluster their recall (Foley & Johnson, 1985).  
Baker-Ward et al. (1990) argued that the self-generated advantage is dependent on “the 
extent to which preexisting knowledge is utilized to provide a meaningful mnemonic 
representation” (p.67). Note that this “elaboration hypothesis” does not attach special status to 
the self per se, but suggests that the kinds of processing carried out when familiar agents are 
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involved is more elaborate than when less familiar agents are involved. This hypothesis is 
relevant to the forensic arena because perpetrators are known to children in some crimes (e.g., 
many cases of physical abuse, sexual abuse, abduction). Support for the “elaboration hypothesis” 
came from a study in which children performed some actions and watched either a familiar or a 
less familiar peer carry out other actions (Baker-Ward et al., 1990, Experiment 2). On a later 
source-discrimination test, children who had watched a less familiar peer carry out actions 
remembered the actions they themselves had performed better than those of their unfamiliar 
partner. Children who had watched a familiar peer perform actions, however, remembered the 
familiar peer’s actions as well as their own. Baker-Ward et al. argued that the improvement in 
memory of the peer’s actions occurred because children could relate the peer’s actions to a rich 
self-schema which increased the availability and accessibility of the items. Hence, the self-
generated advantage occurs because the self is a rich construct of supporting knowledge that 
promotes elaboration of encoded information (see Symons & Johnson, 1997, for a review). In a 
say-imagine source-monitoring task (i.e., Did you really say it or did you imagine saying it?), the 
responses from 7- to 10-year-olds to metamemory questions regarding their source attributions 
after imagining themselves, a parent, or a friend showed that these children spontaneously 
engaged in the kinds of elaborative processing involving familiar people outlined by Baker-Ward 
et al. (Foley, Santini, & Sopasakis, 1989). 
Superior source identification for self-generated items has not been observed in children 
younger than age 6, suggesting that the development of a sense of self during the preschool years 
may be a critical factor for source identification of self-generated items. For example, after 
participating in an interactive event, 6- and 9-year-olds made fewer source errors when they 
answered questions related to actions they had performed compared to questions related to 
actions they had watched a confederate carry out. In contrast, the 4-year-olds made more source 
confusions in response to questions about their own actions than they did about the confederate’s 
actions (Roberts & Blades, 1998). Children develop a sense of self during the preschool years, 
and some researchers have argued that this is one of the main reasons for the development of 
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autobiographical memory and the offset of childhood amnesia at this time (Howe, 1998; Howe, 
Courage, & Peterson, 1994). 
Although source monitoring for memories of familiar agents may be superior to that of 
less familiar agents by age 6, children’s strategic reasoning about familiar sources may still be 
hindered by their limited metamnemonic capacities. In one study (Foley et al., 1983), 6- and 17-
year-olds said and imagined saying words. When later presented with the target words as well as 
distracter items and asked if they had said the words, imagined the words, or if they were new 
words, the 17-year-olds’ errors on the distracter items reflected a tendency to claim that that they 
had imagined saying (rather than actually saying) the distracter item, but the 6-year-olds were 
equally likely to say that they had said or imagined a distracter. Foley and colleagues explained 
the “I-must-have-imagined-it” bias of the adults in terms of metamemory assumptions: As 
people are aware that memories vary in strength and that memories of deeds are stronger than 
memories of actions, they will attribute a vague ‘memory’ of a distracter item to the “imagine” 
condition. According to Foley et al., the children in this study did not exhibit this bias because 
they do not yet use the same metamemory rules. These data highlight the gradual development of 
competent source monitoring and suggest that source monitoring for self-generated items may 
also be dependent on the gradual development of metacognitive understanding during the 
preschool period (see Frye & Moore, 1991; Olson, Astington, & Harris, 1988; Wellman, 1990). 
Further examples are presented in the section Metacognitive Understanding.  
Prospective Processing 
In this section, I focus on the role of cognitive operations in source monitoring with 
particular emphasis on “prospective processes,” that is, the kinds of cognitive operations that are 
carried out to enable one to plan and execute actions. As discussed in the previous section, 
children aged 6 and older showed an advantage for the identification of familiar (e.g., self, 
friend) compared to unfamiliar sources and this was due, in part, to the elaborative processing 
that was spontaneously evoked (Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Foley et al., 1989). Moreover, children 
and adults are consistently more accurate at self-other source monitoring under conditions where 
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the self actions required substantial cognitive effort (e.g., Foley, Durso, Wilder, & Friedman, 
1991; Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981). Cognitive operations for actions may include 
anticipating how one would perform the action, anticipating the action’s consequences, and 
reflecting on the cognitive effort associated with carrying out the action (Ratner et al., 2000). 
Records of these cognitive operations can later be useful cues when discriminating 
memories of sources that required substantial cognitive effort from other sources that did not 
elicit such cognitive effort (e.g., Foley et al., 1991). In other circumstances, however, the kinds 
of cognitive operations produced during events may hinder later source discrimination. Foley 
and Ratner (1998, Experiment 2), for example, asked 6-year-olds to perform and imagine 
performing some actions. The kinds of prospective processing involved in imagining the actions 
was manipulated such that half of the children were encouraged to think about how it would feel 
to carry out the actions (kinesthetic condition) and the others were instructed to consider what 
they would look like if they carried out the actions (visual condition). On a later source test to 
see how well the children discriminated memories of the performed and imagined actions, Foley 
and Ratner found that the children in the kinesthetic condition were more confused than those in 
the visual condition. Foley and Ratner argued that the kinesthetic condition encouraged the 
adoption of a first-person perspective whereas the visual condition supported a third-person 
perspective. Records of the prospective processing in the kinesthetic condition, then, would be 
less helpful in a source judgment between performed and imagined actions than would the 
records of the prospective processing in the visual condition (when the perspective differed 
between the performed and imagined actions). Task-evoked cognitive operations, then, affect the 
accuracy of future source judgments (Johnson et al., 1993).  It may be fruitful, then, to study 
children’s automatic and deliberate use of their own cognitive operations to better understand 
how source monitoring develops through childhood. 
The quality of the cognitive operations carried out during a target event are also affected 
by the context of the event. Within the person-based perspective model of source monitoring (see 
Foley & Ratner, 1998a, in press; Ratner & Foley, 1996; Ratner et al., 2000), two important 
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contextual aspects are the presence of clear goals in the task and the level of collaborative 
activity. The effect of goals on source monitoring is demonstrated in a study where 4-year-olds 
traced and imagined tracing pictures (Ratner et al., 2000). Children in one condition did so in the 
context of a purposeful, goal-related story whereas the remaining children worked with the exact 
same pictures without the story context. Although the children in the Story condition later 
remembered the pictures better than those in the Standard condition, the Story children were 
more confused than were the Standard children regarding whether they had traced or imagined 
tracing the individual pictures. The presence of a goal, then, aided memory but hindered source 
monitoring. The study demonstrated the complex relationship between memory and source 
monitoring and demonstrated that source errors during the preschool years may actually be 
reflecting other aspects of cognitive development. I return to this topic in the following section. 
The effect of goals on source monitoring shows developmental variability. Children aged 
6 and older are quite good at distinguishing memories of what they have done and what a partner 
has done in a goal-oriented, collaborative task (e.g., Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley et al., 1983; 
Foley et al., 1993a; Roberts & Blades, 1998). Compared to older children, those younger than 6 
years make more errors in self-other source monitoring and there is a bias to exaggerate their 
responsibility in the task (Foley et al., 1993a; Roberts & Blades, 1998). In one study (Foley et 
al., 1993a, Experiment 1), 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds alternated placing pieces on a board to make a 
collage of a familiar animal. When later asked who placed which pieces on the board, the 
preschoolers more often inaccurately claimed that they had placed the adults’ pieces on the board 
than did the older children. Interestingly, this “I did it” bias is only observed in such 
collaborative, goal-oriented contexts as building a collage together; when the adult began the 
collage but then allowed the child to complete it alone (i.e., when only the child’s goal was 
driving performance), the bias was not evidenced (Foley et al., 1993a, Experiment 3).  
Foley and Ratner argued that, in collaborative contexts, preschoolers anticipate how their 
own and their partners’ actions will accomplish the goal, thus resulting in a “recoding” of the 
partners’ actions as their own. At test, the cognitive operations (anticipations) that are retrieved 
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for the partners’ actions resemble those of self-performed actions (Foley & Ratner, 1998a; Foley 
et al., 1993a). Manipulations of the recoding process result in predictable effects on the presence 
and strength of the bias. When 4-year-olds were told to “think about how you would put my 
pieces on when it’s my turn” in the collage task, the bias was exaggerated; when recoding was 
minimized by instructions to “think about how I would put my pieces on when it’s my turn,” the 
bias was eliminated altogether (italics added, Foley & Ratner, 1998a). Hence, the adoption of a 
first-person perspective in a collaborative task involving actions by self and another person can 
lead to an increase in source errors. 
Given that sexual abuse can be highly interactive (e.g., removing other person’s clothing, 
touching) and that interviews are social situations, the person-based perspective (e.g., Ratner et 
al., 2000) may improve our understanding of children’s, especially preschoolers’, source 
monitoring in the forensic arena. Also, the person-based perspective can contribute to our 
understanding of children’s abuse allegations because the perspective focuses on the meaning of 
the event to the individual which, in turn, affects the nature of prospective processing. 
The Relationship of Source Errors to Other Cognitive Skills. 
Why might preschoolers show the aforementioned biases in collaborative contexts? 
Theories of learning can help explain this phenomenon. Children who engage with adults on 
tasks can later carry out the task alone better than children who did not have such previous 
collaborative experience (e.g., Rogoff, 1980). Children are effectively assimilating their partners’ 
knowledge when they recode their partners’ actions. Source-monitoring confusions in some 
circumstances, then, may actually index efficient learning (Ratner et al., 2000). This proposition 
was supported in a study in which kindergartners’ (mean age 5 years 6 months) memory and 
categorization skills for furniture placement in a doll’s house were compared with their source-
monitoring errors in collaborative or non-collaborative contexts (Ratner et al., 2000, Experiment 
2). In the Collaboration condition, each child chose the rooms and the furniture to go in the 
rooms but the child and adult alternated placing the pieces in the room; in the No-Collaboration 
condition, the experimenter had already placed half of the pieces into designated rooms and the 
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child was merely required to place the remaining pieces in the rooms. Compared to children in 
the No-Collaboration condition, those who collaborated were more confused when asked to 
indicate who placed which pieces into the house and showed the “I did it” bias (i.e., claimed that 
they had placed the experimenters’ pieces). However, the children in the Collaboration condition 
also showed superior organizational memory when asked to place the pieces back into the house. 
Hence, the children who made most source-monitoring errors were also the children who learned 
the most from the task. Ratner and colleagues argued that this was because the collaborative 
nature of the task allowed children to recode their partners’ actions as if they were their own, 
which was an opportunity denied to those in the No-Collaboration condition. Follow-up research 
showed that exposure to the experimenters’ plans and actions, the child’s own planning of 
actions, and turn-taking were not responsible for the pattern of results (Ratner et al., 2000).  
Rather than conceptualizing source confusions as undesirable cognitive errors, then, 
Foley’s and Ratner’s research suggests that source confusions may be epiphenomena of 
processes that promote learning (Ratner et al., 2000). It has also been suggested that at times of 
intense learning (such as during the preschool period), it is more important to focus cognitive 
resources on extracting the content of encountered information than deploy valuable processing 
capacity on encoding and retrieving information that enables accurate source judgments 
(Roberts, 2000; Roberts & Blades, 2000). This has implications for our understanding of 
children’s testimony because of the importance of accurately retrieving encoded information 
about experienced events. In some justice systems, alleged child victims of multiple sexual abuse 
are required to provide specific details of each incident such as the time, place, and exact actions 
that transpired (S. vs. R., 1989). This requires, then, that children remember the details (i.e., the 
content) of what occurred and tag those details to the context in which it occurred (e.g., time and 
place); in other words, they must monitor the source of the retrieved information. In laboratory 
settings, children who have experienced multiple, similar events find it difficult to retrieve a 
detail from a particular incident (Fivush et al., 1992; Hudson, 1990; Powell et al., 1999). An 
analysis of children’s errors, however, shows that they have impressive memories of what they 
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have experienced: Children most commonly erred by reporting a detail from one experienced 
incident as if it had happened in another experienced incident (e.g., claiming that they heard the 
story about Supercat during the last incident, when they actually heard the Supercat story in the 
penultimate incident, Powell et al., 1999). In other words, although children were confused about 
when something happened, they could accurately recall what happened. Applied to the above 
discussion, children who showed poor source monitoring had actually learned the material well 
(i.e., remembered information from the different incidents). In some US jurisdictions, the 
requirement to identify the time of individual incidents is relaxed for multiple events, thus 
acknowledging the particular difficulties that child witnesses have when recalling multiple 
events. Interested readers are referred to Roberts and Powell (in press) regarding the application 
of research on children’s memories of repeated experiences to investigations of chronic sexual 
abuse.   
A consideration of the cognitive processes evoked during the target event can help 
explain why material that is familiar or well-learned may be most susceptible to source 
confusions. It has been demonstrated in several studies that source judgments regarding material 
that is easily processed are more difficult than source judgments for material that required some 
effortful processing (Finke, Johnson, & Shyi, 1988; Foley et al., 1991). Foley et al. (1991) 
presented a set of words and pictures to 6-year-olds, 9-year-olds, and adults. Half of the words 
and half of the pictures were of simple items and the rest comprised complex items (according to 
norms published by Snodgrass & Vanderwart, 1980). All participants were later more confused 
about the origin (word or picture) of the simple than the complex items. As the simple items 
required little cognitive effort to process, Foley and colleagues argued that the processing 
involved in imaging the objects represented by words resembled relatively automatic perceptual 
processing of a picture, thus making later source discrimination difficult because of the lack of 
cognitive operations cues. Similarly, when adults were shown shapes and told to imagine half-
shapes whole, those who were classified as “vivid imagers” were more confused between 
whether they had seen or imagined shapes than were “low imagers” (Markham & Hynes, 1993). 
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The authors reasoned that the low imagers would have memories containing useful cognitive 
operations given that it should take them more effort to image than it would vivid imagers.   
Research on the role of effortful cognitive operations in source monitoring can be applied 
to forensic investigations. If children are asked a suggestive question (i.e., asked about 
something that they have not spontaneously mentioned) that relates to a detail that is nevertheless 
familiar to children, the item may be easily processed because previous memories may be re-
activated and/or the non-experienced details may be easily and vividly imaged. This can have at 
least two detrimental effects on memory: (a) children may assume that it must have happened 
because the suggestion evoked elaborative and associative processes which allowed the detail to 
be incorporated into a rich network, and (b) at a later time, if the content of the suggestion is 
remembered, children may assume that it must have happened given the absence of effortful 
operations in their memories. This may explain why script-consistent or plausible suggestions 
are more readily accepted than are script-inconsistent items (Pezdek, Finger, & Hodge, 1997). 
Presumably, the script-consistent items are easily and automatically processed into a rich, 
associative network that accommodates the detail easily. During later questioning about the item, 
few effortful cognitive operations may be present in the memory representation and the item may 
be misattributed to an actual experience rather than to a suggestive utterance. 
Hence, although source-monitoring errors are generally considered to reflect immaturities 
of the developing memory system, several scenarios have been presented that show that these 
errors are sometimes accompanied by improvements in other cognitive skills. Applied to 
investigative interviews, young children who make source errors are not necessarily providing 
inaccurate reports in general. The exact nature of the relationship between memory, source 
monitoring, and other cognitive developments, however, has yet to be determined.  
Metacognitive Understanding 
 Very young children may not make accurate source decisions simply because they do not 
see the need to distinguish memories of different sources of information. Taylor, Esbensen, and 
Bennett (1994) taught preschoolers facts that they did not know prior to the study (e.g., cats 
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chase mice, bears are brown). When they subsequently asked the preschoolers to state where 
they had learned the information, children under 5-years and even some 5-year-olds reported that 
they had always known the information. It was only when the learning ‘event’ was made salient 
(by explicitly telling the children that they were going to be taught something new) that they 
could identify the time at which they learned the facts. Taylor and colleagues argued that the 
children did not understand that access to a source of knowledge (e.g., through hearing or seeing 
some information) is a necessary condition of knowing. Although children younger than 5-years 
can sometimes accurately distinguish sources (e.g., some types of action memories) as well as 
older children (e.g., Foley et al., 1993a; Roberts & Blades, 1995), preschoolers tend to make 
more source-monitoring errors than older children (Foley et al., 1993a; Lindsay et al., 1991; 
Poole & Lindsay, 2001a; Roberts & Blades, 1999). Perhaps these young children have not yet 
realized that the connection between knowledge and its source is important or perhaps they fail 
to consistently apply this understanding.  
Not only must young children appreciate knowledge-source connections, they must also 
learn to make assessments about the reliability of the sources of information to which they are 
exposed. It has been argued that young children indiscriminately treat information that they have 
gained through direct experience as more reliable than information that an adult tells them (e.g., 
Perner, 1991). Recent evidence shows that, in some circumstances, children do make appropriate 
distinctions between more and less informative sources irrespective of whether the source was 
direct experience. In a series of experiments, Robinson and colleagues showed that 3- to 5-year-
olds relied on information presented by a knowledgeable source more than that from a less 
informed source, regardless of whether the child or an experimenter was the knowledgeable 
source (Robinson, 2000; Whitcombe & Robinson, 2000). In one study (Whitcombe & Robinson, 
2000), 3- to 5-year-olds saw pairs of objects that looked the same but felt different (e.g., a full 
and an empty bottle of dishwashing liquid) or looked different but felt the same (e.g., a red ball 
and a blue ball). One of the objects was secretly removed and either the child or the experimenter 
was allowed to see or feel the object; when the experimenter inspected the object, she stated 
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what it was. Clearly, looking at the object is more informative when the object feels the same but 
looks different to its partner, and feeling the object is more informative when it feels different to 
its partner but looks the same. Additionally, the person who sees or feels the object is more 
informed than the one who did not have the opportunity to inspect the object. At test, the 
children were highly accurate at naming which object was taken from the pair showing 
sensitivity to the informativeness of different sources, regardless of whether the child or 
experimenter inspected, and whether the object was seen or felt. The children had difficulty, 
however, stating how they knew what the object was and this was particularly apparent for the 
youngest children.  
The data reported by Robinson (2000) and Whitcombe and Robinson (2000) demonstrate 
that even very young children can use knowledge from different sources appropriately and are 
not uniformly reliant on adults’ statements; however, the fact that they cannot reflect on their 
judgments provides further evidence that difficulty with reflective skills partly underlies the 
development of source monitoring. The finding that the children treated the utterances of a less 
knowledgeable experimenter (compared to themselves) more cautiously than when the 
experimenter was knowledgeable suggests that use of an introductory statement in a forensic 
interview declaring ignorance on the part of the interviewer (e.g., “I wasn’t there that day and so 
don’t know what happened. It’s your job to tell me everything that happened so that I will 
know.”) serves a useful purpose. However, if young children encounter a source that claims or is 
perceived to be knowledgeable (e.g., someone who is coaching the child to report a fictitious 
event, or an interviewer with a priori beliefs), according to Robinson’s findings, the result may 
be false reports or false memories of events that did not occur. Recent research on children’s 
suggestibility further informs this reasoning. Preschoolers who show an understanding that 
another person can hold a belief that is false were more misled by a knowledgeable interviewer 
than a naïve interviewer, even after controlling for age and memory (Welch-Ross, 1999a). In 
other words, when given a choice between the original information in the target event (in this 
case, a story) and the suggested (inaccurate) information provided by an interviewer who 
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claimed to know about the story, children chose the suggested information more often than the 
original story information. An understanding that specific knowledge originates with specific 
sources, then, may be an important prerequisite of source-monitoring development and is 
supported by research showing that origins-of-knowledge understanding precedes some kinds of 
source monitoring (see data reported in Welch-Ross, 2000). 
According to the mental-state reasoning model (Welch-Ross, 2000), the development of 
source monitoring is related to the development of representational understanding. Of particular 
interest is the relation between preschoolers’ understanding of conflicting mental representations 
and their suggestibility. Conflicting mental representations about a single entity arises from 
different sources of information. One may have conflicting mental representations, for example, 
about a sponge that is painted to look like a rock (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1983). One 
representation corresponds to its appearance (a rock) and the other to reality (a sponge). Children 
aged 3 years and younger can only reason about one of the representations at a time, the exact 
one being determined by the focus of the task. The ability to consider both representations is 
present at about age 5. In an experiment examining the relation between the understanding of 
conflicting mental representations and suggestibility (Welch-Ross et al., 1997), 3-, 4-, and 5-
year-old children listened to a story and were later misled about some details in the story. 
Children who understood conflicting mental representations were less suggestible a week later, 
even after age and memory were controlled. In another study, children who could reason about 
conflicting mental representations were also less resistant to suggestions when first presented 
(Welch-Ross, 1999b). Welch-Ross argued that the children who could not reason about 
conflicting mental representations simply updated their memories of the story when they 
encountered the conflicting postevent misinformation, thus reasoning about just one 
representation (Welch-Ross et al., 1997, Welch-Ross, 1999b). There is some debate regarding 
whether the proposed updating mechanism involves source-monitoring skills. One possibility is 
that the children with little understanding of conflicting mental representations failed to consider 
source information when processing information about the experienced events.  
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It should be noted, however, that an understanding of conflicting mental representations 
is no guarantee against source errors. According to the mental-state reasoning model of 
suggestibility (Welch-Ross, 2000), children who understand multiple, mental representations can 
still be confused between experienced and suggested information if they are able to retrieve both 
versions of events. Indeed, among preschoolers who understood conflicting mental 
representations, those with good memories of the event were more suggestible than those with 
poorer memories of the event (Welch-Ross, 1999b). Welch-Ross argued that those with good 
memories of the event were more likely to remember both the original and suggested information 
and be confused between the two versions of events. In support of this, those with higher 
conflicting mental representation scores took longer to produce the incorrect answer (i.e., the 
suggested version) than did those with lower conflicting mental representation scores, suggesting 
that the former were actually considering both representations. Hence this research suggests that 
preschoolers may be suggestible because they often do not consider multiple sources (i.e., the 
original and suggested information), but even when they do consider multiple representations, 
they can still be confused when tagging the source to the information. The mental-state reasoning 
model, then, specifies several components that may be involved in a source-monitoring 
judgment. Although an understanding of conflicting mental representations may be necessary for 
source monitoring, it is not alone sufficient to guarantee source accuracy. 
In summary, research on representational understanding has implications in the case of 
children’s eyewitness reports because sometimes interviewers can present information to 
children that conflicts with what the child remembers about the event. The research reviewed 
above suggests that although children under 5 years may be able to use knowledge sources 
appropriately according to the level of informativeness, in some circumstances, they may not be 
able to reflect on those sources. Indeed, these young children may not have the hardware to carry 
out sophisticated source-monitoring operations because the frontal lobe, which has been 
functionally implicated in source monitoring judgments, is immature in children of this age 
(Newcombe, Drummey, Fox, Lie, & Ottinger-Alberts, 2000; Schacter, Kagan, & Leichtman, 
Children’s ability to distinguish          27 
1995). With the exception of one study (Thierry et al., in press), attempts to train source-
monitoring skills have not been as successful with 3- and 4-year-olds as they have with older 
children (Leichtman et al., 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001a, 2001b). The issue of training source-
monitoring skills is more fully discussed in the next section.  
The Stringency of Source Decisions 
As discussed earlier, source monitoring can be carried out automatically or with 
deliberate effort, and automatic and deliberate processes may be used together (Johnson et al., 
1993). Distracting attention away from deliberate source monitoring, then, should increase errors 
in source discrimination; similarly, increasing the required stringency of the source decision-
making process should reduce errors in source discrimination. Source errors are generally 
reduced, though not eliminated, following explicit instructions to consider the sources of 
information (Lindsay, in press; Lindsay, Gonzales, & Eso, 1995; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; 
Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). In a study reported by Lindsay and colleagues (Lindsay, in press; 
Lindsay et al., 1995) children were questioned about a story they had read and about which a 
confederate had provided misleading information. Half of the children were explicitly told that 
the confederate had made some mistakes and that they should not report anything that the 
confederate had told them. In free recall, third-graders supplied the original detail and chose it 
more often in a forced-choice recognition test comprising the original detail, the misled detail, 
and a distracter than did third-graders who were not given the warning. The warning also 
reduced preschoolers’ reporting of the suggested details in the recognition test but had no effect 
on the frequency of providing the original details in free recall. Lindsay et al.’s results show that 
merely highlighting multiple sources and instructing children to report information from only 
one source reduced the number of source errors made, and this increased resistance to suggestive 
influences.  
Interviewing protocols that reduce children’s source errors are clearly beneficial in the 
field of forensic interviews because interventions to reduce source confusions can usually only 
be carried out at the investigative stage. Because police officers have no control over the number 
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of potentially contaminating sources to which child victims and witnesses have been exposed 
(e.g., television, informal interviews, peer conversations), they need ways of minimizing the 
reporting of source errors at formal interviews. There are two main ways that researchers have 
tried to investigate procedures that increase the stringency of source decision processes after 
children have observed or interacted in complex events: By “inoculating” children against source 
errors before they are asked to give their reports, and by using source-monitoring questions as a 
“recantation” device. I explore the small number of relevant studies in turn.  
Both fuzzy-trace and source-monitoring theories predict that reinforcing memories will 
result in more accurate source discrimination though each postulates different mechanisms. 
According to fuzzy-trace theory, procedures that keep the verbatim trace intact improve the 
chances of retrieving the source information associated with the detail (e.g., Brainerd et al., 
1990). According to source-monitoring theory, intact memory traces contain information that can 
be used to make an attribution about source (see Johnson et al., 1993). For example, a memory 
with vivid perceptual and sensory information leads to an attribution that one was touched, 
whereas a memory with degraded sensory information about touching may lead one to make the 
attribution that the touching could only have been watched on television. 
Parker (1995) found that children who were interviewed immediately after they had 
performed and imagined actions in a set of vignettes were more accurate at identifying the source 
of actions when tested two weeks later than children who did not have an immediate interview. 
Parker argued that reinforcing memory had an inoculatory effect on source monitoring. In more 
recent studies, reinforcing children’s memories has been as beneficial in reducing children’s 
source errors as explicitly directing attention to the sources of experienced information. In one 
study, 3- and 5-year-olds watched a video, heard a story, and played with some toy frogs (Dixon, 
1996, reported in Leichtman et al., 2000). The key details in each of the three experiences were 
then reviewed with (source-reinforced condition) or without (memory-reinforced condition) 
reference to source. A control group of children did not undergo the reinforcement phase. All 
children then heard misinformation about each of the experiences. Later the children were given 
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a forced choice test between the original and suggested details followed by a source-monitoring 
question to see whether the children could tag the detail to the correct source. Although the 3-
year-olds performed below chance in all conditions, the 5-year-olds in the source-reinforced and 
the memory-reinforced conditions reported the original details and accurately identified the 
source of details more often than children in the control condition. There was no difference, 
however, in memory and source monitoring between the two reinforcement conditions. Using a 
similar design, Thierry et al. (in press) also found that the effects of rehearsing memory of the 
content of the events (in this case, a real-life and a video) on 5- to 6-year-olds’ reports were 
similar to the effects of rehearsing the source of the information. In contrast to Leichtman et al.’s 
results, however, Thierry et al. did find that the source-monitoring questions lowered 3- and 4-
year-olds’ source confusions.   
Even if the techniques were found to be effective, the feasibility of using these in a 
forensic context needs examination.  In forensic investigations, interviewers often do not have 
the luxury of knowing which sources may interfere with children’s reports of a target event. An 
inoculation procedure will be most useful in the field, then, if it is a general procedure that can be 
used even when the exact sources are not known. Poole and Lindsay developed a procedure that 
can be used whenever it is at least known that children must distinguish between what they have 
actually experienced and what they have heard (Poole & Lindsay, 2001b). In Poole’s and 
Lindsay’s study, 3- to 8-year-olds interacted in a set of science demonstrations and, three months 
later, listened to a story containing misleading information about the science experiments. 
Immediately before the interview about the target event (the science experiments), half of the 
children watched the interviewer carry out some actions (e.g., wiping the tape recorder) and 
heard about (but did not witness) other actions (e.g., “sometimes I push the blue button”). The 
children were then asked about the actions that the interviewer had just carried out and the 
interviewer reinforced and highlighted to the children which actions were actually witnessed and 
which were only heard about. When asked focused questions about the target event, the 7- to 8-
year-olds, but not the younger children, reported fewer story events as if they had actually 
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happened than did children whose interview did not begin with an inoculation phase. As the 
inoculation procedure had no effect on the reporting of experienced events, these results suggest 
that children can be encouraged to increase the stringency of their source monitoring without 
other adverse effects on their reports. As with much research on strategy improvement (see Kail, 
1990), however, younger children failed to generalize their learning from one task to another. 
This result is unfortunate given that young children are those most in need of additional support 
for their source-monitoring judgments.  
Using source-monitoring questions to provide children with a way to recant their false 
reports also appears to have some, albeit limited, value. As with source error inoculation, 
children older than about 6 years benefit more than younger children, but not all source errors are 
eliminated. Most studies have investigated children’s source errors for experienced and non-
experienced events; in most studies, the non-experienced event corresponds to hearing 
misinformation about the event either before (Leichtman & Ceci, 1995) or after (Bruck, Melnyk, 
& Ceci, 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001a) the target event, although in one study (Jens, Gordon, & 
Shaddock, 1990) the non-experienced event took the form of imagined actions. In all studies, 
children who falsely reported non-experienced (suggested) information were then given a 
source-monitoring question about each falsely-reported detail (e.g., Did you really see that or did 
you hear about it?). The source-monitoring questions, in essence, allowed children to retract their 
false reports. As can be seen in Table 2, the recantation rates in these studies following the 
source-monitoring questions show age-related increases, with 3- to 4-year-olds evidencing low 
recantation rates and 8-year-olds the highest. Clearly, differences in procedural aspects of these 
studies, such as the length of time from the target event to test and the salience of the fictitious 
events, resulted in differences in findings, but the studies do suggest that a significant amount of 
false reports can be retracted by encouraging children to monitor the source of recalled 
information. Given that social pressures may encourage children to maintain a consistent story, 
one can speculate that the rate of retractions would be higher with a source-monitoring procedure 
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set in a non-accusatory context, although retractions can also be the result of compliance with the 
interviewer leading to false positives.  
The studies reviewed above highlight the malleability of children’s source monitoring. 
Children, especially those older than about 6 years, showed sensitivity to the stringency of source 
decision processes. Source errors were reduced through relatively easy manipulations before and 
after reports of a target event were elicited. In line with the research discussed throughout the 
review, very young children (i.e., under age 4) appeared to have little or no ability to reflect on 
where they heard non-experienced events.  
Summary of Forensic Implications 
 There are many applications of source-monitoring research to the forensic arena. Two 
major areas stand out: (a) the expectations of child witnesses, and b) interviewing protocols.  
Expectations of Child Witnesses 
Children’s testimony can be challenged on the basis of their confusions regarding when 
and where an incident occurred. As previously mentioned, prosecution in some jurisdictions is 
only possible when children have been able to separate their memories of individual occurrences. 
Clearly, if children cannot specify individual incidents, it is difficult for prosecutors to collect 
corroborating information and it is also difficult for alleged perpetrators to exonerate themselves 
by providing alibis for individual incidents. Also, given that punitive consequences in confirmed 
cases often depend on the number as well as the nature of the criminal acts, it is important that 
witnesses identify individual incidents. Research on children’s source monitoring, however, 
raises the question of whether this standard is too high when children have experienced multiple 
similar events. According to source-monitoring theory and as demonstrated in the research 
discussed above, events that are similar and predictable can be difficult for children (and adults) 
to distinguish (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Lindsay et al., 1991; Powell et al., 1999; Roberts & 
Blades, 1999). Given that the nature of sexual abuse often entails similar, predictable events as 
indexed by children’s testimony such as “it was the same as last time” or “he always does it like 
this” (Roberts & Powell, in press), conditions in sexual abuse cases in particular (compared to 
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typical one-time crimes such as road traffic accidents, adbuctions) are ripe for source confusions 
which may seriously impede prosecution. This is tragic given that the children who have been 
abused the most (i.e., repeatedly) may be the least able to provide accurately source-indexed 
reports. (It is noteworthy, however, that children’s memories after a series of repeated events can 
be accurate and highly resistant to suggestions when the details of each of the events do not vary; 
Powell et al., 1999).  
This also speaks to a wider issue regarding our conceptions of source errors. 
Traditionally, source confusions have been conceptualized as a negative aspect of cognitive 
behavior. Source confusions index failures in the processes that lead to successful cognitive 
skills and, in the legal system, are impediments to successful prosecution. As discussed above, 
however, children who were confused about the origin of actions evidenced better learning of a 
task (Ratner et al., 2000), children with an understanding of mind and good memories of multiple 
sources committed source errors (Welch-Ross, 1999b), and children who confused memories of 
multiple incidents rarely reported entirely false information (Powell et al., 1999). In other words, 
young children’s competence in other cognitive skills may have been at the expense of their 
source monitoring. A balanced view of children’s reports, then, can acknowledge the seriousness 
of the presence of source errors but also note the sophisticated skills that children are bringing to 
the interview situation: The presence of source errors does not necessarily indicate that 
children’s reports about what occurred is inaccurate. 
Although exposure to non-target sources (e.g., post-event discussions, interviews) can 
sometimes improve memories and source monitoring of a target event through reinstatement 
(Marche, 1999; Principe, Ornstein, Baker-Ward, & Gordon, 2000; Roberts, Lamb, & Sternberg, 
1999; Warren & Lane, 1995), some errors in children’s testimony are the result of confusing 
target information and suggested information (e.g., Bruck et al., 2000; Poole & Lindsay, 2001a). 
The extent of children’s suggestibility is partly determined by factors beyond children’s control, 
such as lengthy delays in the criminal justice system, suggestive questioning in formal 
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interviews, and so on (see Bruck & Ceci, 1999 for a review). The responsibility for reducing 
children’s source errors, then, lies in the system as much as in children’s abilities.  
Finally, we are relatively naïve in our expectations about children from special 
populations. Children with autism (Farrant, Blades, & Boucher, 1998) and others with ‘mental 
retardation’ (Jens et al., 1990) showed no source-monitoring deficits compared to age-matched 
controls, but Lorsbach has consistently found that children with learning difficulties have 
difficulty distinguishing the sources of their memories (Lorsbach & Ewing, 1995; Lorsbach, 
Katz, & Cupak, 1998) possibly because they have difficulty with reflective processing and verbal 
tests (Lorsbach, 2000). Given that children from special populations can suffer higher rates of 
crimes against them, it is important to ensure that children from diverse backgrounds are 
included in source-monitoring research if we are to develop accurate expectations and 
appropriate interviewing protocols.  
Interviewing Protocols 
There are several reasons why specialized interviewing protocols that address children’s 
source confusions are beneficial. First, the questions asked in forensic interviews often implicitly 
require children to spontaneously monitor source by asking them to retrieve information from the 
target event and to gate out or inhibit information from competing sources, such as that 
encountered in pre-event or post-event experiences. Yet children do not always spontaneously 
use the source-specifying information that they have stored in their memories to accurately 
discriminate sources. Accurate source identification often involves more strategic decision 
making and it is possible that children have a tendency to report the information that they 
remember without recalling its source or engaging in a more intensive and strategic analysis of 
its source. Second, although children’s reports about actual and fictitious events sometimes do 
differ qualitatively (e.g., Alonso-Quecuty, 1995; Santtila, Roppola, & Niemi, 1999; Roberts, 
Lamb, Zale, & Randall, 1998), in some circumstances (e.g., after repeated, suggestive 
interviews) children’s true and false reports are often qualitatively indistinguishable even by 
those with extensive experience with children’s reports (e.g., Ceci et al., 1994). Hence, research 
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on helping children to strategically reduce their own source errors may help improve the 
accuracy of their testimony.  
Increasing the stringency of children’s source monitoring by deliberately directing 
attention to potentially contaminating sources either before or after reports are given can reduce 
(but not eliminate) children’s source errors (e.g., Lindsay, in press; Lindsay et al., 1995; Poole & 
Lindsay, 2001a, 2001b). The effectiveness of these procedures are age-related. Very young 
children aged 4 and under have difficulty identifying source even when they are directly 
questioned about the sources. More research on source-monitoring interventions is needed before 
definitive conclusions can be drawn about their potential usefulness in the field, especially as the 
interventions have not appeared to reduce source errors in young children’s recall (e.g., Lindsay, 
in press; Poole & Lindsay, 2001b). Theoretically-driven training studies can extend our 
understanding of how children monitor source. Given the developmental variability in source 
monitoring discussed above, age-specific interventions may be needed. It may be that children 
who have less well developed reflective (Lorsbach, 2000), metamnemonic (Foley et al., 1983), 
strategic (Thierry et al., in press), and inhibitory (Roberts & Powell, 2001) skills, such as young 
children, stand little to gain from these kinds of procedures.  
Conclusions 
 The development of children’s source monitoring occurs in conjunction with other 
childhood developments such as a sense of self, representational understanding, and 
metamnemonic skills. Interestingly, source errors can be considered markers of competent 
cognitive functioning in other domains. Although there is a general reduction in source errors as 
children age, there is considerable variability in the development of different kinds of source 
monitoring. Rudimentary source skills are evident before children can explicitly reflect on the 
sources of learned information but, in general, children’s competence at explicit source 
monitoring develops towards the end of the preschool period and continues to about age 8 or 9. 
 Although source confusions may be an inevitable part of children’s cognitive 
development and can provide us with realistic expectations of child witnesses, source confusions 
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in crime allegations are nevertheless problematic. Understanding what underlies children’s 
source errors can help develop interviewing protocols that reduce the likelihood of errors. The 
theories and research reviewed here suggest three main avenues of source errors in children aged 
under 10: Memory problems, the automatic or deliberate use of cues in source judgments, and 
deficiencies in strategic processing. First, as source can sometimes be directly recalled (e.g., 
Reyna & Brainerd, 1998), and (even if source is not directly recalled) recalled information can 
be used to make a source attribution (Johnson et al., 1983), research can focus on the 
development of children’s memory skills, particularly encoding, storage, and retrieval 
mechanisms. Second, although an examination of the qualitative characteristics of memories can 
lead to source identification (Johnson et al., 1993), children may not take advantage of the 
information stored in their memories. Preschoolers, for example, may not be aware that specific 
knowledge originates from specific origins and, thus, they may be unaware that memories of 
different sources have distinct qualitative profiles. A lack of understanding about mental 
operations may result in deficits in the ability to use cognitive operations represented in 
memories to make a source identification (recall that cognitive operations are vitally important 
cues to source, see Foley et al., 1993b; Johnson et al., 1993). Additionally, children may not 
engage in a thorough search of their memories, perhaps considering only one kind of 
information. As reviewed in the literature above, flexibility in the examination of memory 
characteristics and a consideration of multiple cues aids accurate source monitoring. Thirdly, 
strategic decision processes can be used to identify source when source cannot be recalled and 
when an examination of the characteristics of memories does not aid in a source judgment. The 
use of cognitive strategies develops through to adolescence and so it is likely that this source-
monitoring mechanism is the last to develop of the three avenues outlined here. Such strategies 
may include deliberate reflection on the sources of information, using general knowledge to infer 
source, and voluntarily altering the stringency of source decision making.  
 The research reviewed above shows that children’s source monitoring is affected by the 
nature of the target event(s), individual differences, and the nature of the source-monitoring task. 
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Children’s evidence can be informative even when there are source errors. It is the responsibility 
of players in the justice system to take advantage of children’s capabilities and make adjustments 
whenever possible to minimize those source errors that are detrimental to the prosecution of 
those who perpetrate crimes against children. Such adjustments may require attention to “system 
variables” (e.g., delays between incidents and investigations; Wells, 1983) and developing age-
appropriate expectations of child witnesses that feed into effective interviewing protocols. 
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Table 1 
Examples of source judgments in the forensic arena 
 
Source judgment Examples 
Within-Event Which of two people carried out an action in a target incident? 
Did he take your clothes off or did you take them off? 
Event-Postevent Did X actually happen in the event or did Y tell you about it when 
she interviewed you? 
Preevent-Event Did Y tell you that it was going to happen or did you really see it 
happen in the event? 
Multiple Event Were you touched on your bottom during the first incident or the 
second incident? 
Credibility judgments Interviewers’ judgments about the sources of children’s memories 
(e.g., accounts of experienced or imagined events) based on 
interviewers’ own source decision-making biases 
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Table 2 
The rates of recantation in response to source-monitoring questions probing false reports of 
fictitious events 
 
Study Origin of false report Age Recantation rate 
Poole and Lindsay (2001a) Heard about touching events 3-4 years 0% 
  7 years 67% 
  8 years 63% 
 
Bruck et al. (2000) Heard suggestions at interview 3-6 years 14% 
 
 
Jens et al. (1991) Imaginary actions 6 years 78% 
 






Leichtman and Ceci (1995)a Heard suggestions before target 
event 
4-6 years 50-75% 
 
 
aRecantation rates were estimated using information in the text and figures.  
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Footnote 
1Readers interested in further theoretical discussions about the treatment of the similarity issue in 
source-monitoring and fuzzy-trace theories should consult Lindsay & Johnson (in press),  Reyna 
(in press), and Reyna and Lloyd (1997). 
 
